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CASE NOTES
CRIMINAL LAW - Insanity as a Defense - Tests for
Determining. - Appellant raped a nine year old girl. He
neither denied commission of the act, nor that he knew his
act was wrong. Rather, he sought to excuse his action by
showing that he suffered from a mental illness which ren-
dered him incapable of overcoming the urge to touch and
molest young girls. The trial court found him guilty and sen-
tenced him to death. On appeal, HELD: Affirmed. The court
was not convinced that the M'Naghten rule is not the best
available test for measuring the mental condition of an in-
dividual in terms of accountability for his criminal acts.
Piccott v. State, 116 So. 2d 626 (Fla. 1960).
It is a well established principle of Anglo-American law
that insanity negates criminal intent, and is, therefore, a de-
fense to crimes which require criminal intent as an essen-
tial element. One of the earliest tests of legal insanity was
the "wild beast" theory whereby the accused was not held
responsible if he did not know what he was doing anymore
than a wild beast. Rex v. Arnold, 16 How. St. Tr. 695 (1724).
This was superceded by the "right-wrong" test. Earl Ferrer's
Case, 19 How. St. Tr. 886 (1760). The "right-wrong" test is
that the accused will not be held responsible, if at the time of
committing the act, he was suffering from a disease of the
mind so as not to know the nature of what he was doing, or,
if he did know, he did not know it was wrong, received its
classic formation in M'Naghten's Case, 10 Cl. & Fin. 200, 8
Eng. Rep. 718 (1843). It appears that the irresistible impulse
test, whereby the accused will not be held accountable if he
was suffering from a mental disease or defect which pro-
duced an irresistible impulse to commit an act, first received
legal recognition in Massachusetts. Commonwealth v. Rogers,
7 Metc. 500 (Mass. 1844). Basically, the irresistible test to-
day has two forms. One, the accused will not be held respon-
sible when he is so diseased in mind that he cannot distin-
guish between right and wrong, or, if he is able to do so, he
does not possess power sufficient to suppress an irresistible
impulse to do an act. Parsons v. State, 81 Ala. 577, 2 So. 854
(1887) ; Ryan v. People, 60 Colo. 425, 153 Pac. 756 (1915) ;
Thompson v. Commonwealth, 193 Va. 704, 70 S. E. 2d 284
(1952). Two, the accused will not be held responsible when
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he is unable to resist an irresistible impulse growing out of
a mental disease. Flowers v. State, 236 Ind. 151, 139 N. E.
2d 185 (1956) ; State v. Blair, 118 Vt. 81, 99 A. 2d 677 (1953).
Another rule, followed by Georgia provides that although one
may have the ability to distinguish between right and wrong,
yet, if in consequence of a delusion arising from a diseased
mind he is impelled to do an act, he will be excused. Roberts
v. State, 3 Ga. 310 (1847) ; McKethan v. State, 201 Ga. 23,
39 S. E. 2d 15 (1946). At an early date New Hampshire
adopted a rule which has remained exclusively its own. If
the act was the offspring or product of mental illness in the
defendant, he is not guilty by reason of insanity. State v.
Pike, 49 N. H. 399 (1870); State v. Jones, 50 N. H. 369
(1871). The famous Durham case laid down the rule that
the accused will not be held criminally responsible if his un-
lawful act was the product of mental disease or mental de-
fect. Durham v. United States, 214 F. 2d 862 (D. C. Cir.
1954). The M'Naghten rule was widely adopted and is now
the sole test of legal insanity in most common law jurisdic-
tions. People v. Berry, 282 P. 2d 861 (Cal. 1955); State v.
Auld, 2 N. J. 426, 67 A. 2d 175 (1949) ; People v. Horton, 308
N. Y. 1, 123 N. E. 2d 609 (1954) ; 45 A. L. R. 2d 1447 (1954).
Moreover, tests other than M'Naghten's rule have been ex-
pressly disapproved in some jurisdictions. State v. Gatlin,
208 S. C. 414, 38 S. E. 2d 238 (1946) ; State v. Odell, 227 P.
2d 710 (Wash. 1951).
The M'Naghten rule has been under attack for some time,
the fundamental objection being that criminal responsibility
is made to rest upon one symptom, the accused's ability to dis-
tinguish between right and wrong. This, it is said, ties the
jury down and precludes its considering other possible causes
of the commission of the unlawful act. If this be a valid ob-
jection, does the irresistible impulse or Durham rule remedy
it? The irresistible impulse test postulates that a person of
normal intelligence, who understands what he is doing, and
knows that he is committing a grossly immoral act, may be
excused by pleading that he had an irresistible impulse to
commit that act. In other words, a rational being may be in-
sane. The adoption of this test of criminal responsibility would
allow psychiatrists, as expert witnesses, who claim to be un-
able to testify under the M'Naghten rule, to testify in almost
any way they please and in support of any conceivable theory
concerning the defendant's mental condition. Then the jury
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will have to plough their way through a mass of scientific
terminology and conflicting theories. The Durham rule does
offer a slight bit of guidance by giving some direction to the
jury in its search for the facts relevant to the accused's re-
sponsibility. However, it must make determinations about
degrees of impairment or disease which puzzle the experts
themselves. The jury is called upon to decide causation, but
here they can do no more than speculate. The main trouble
with this rule is that it ignores a question which is crucial
from the perspective of the law, that is, whether the accused
was competent to make the relevant moral decision. Under
the M'Naghten rule not only is causation no such separate
problem, but also no question arises concerning the determin-
ation of degrees of impairment or disease. Although M'Nagh-
ten's rule is phrased in terms of cognition, it generally is in-
terpreted broadly by the courts with the result that all psy-
chiatric evidence relevant to the defendant's mental condition
is admitted. M'Naghten's rule is functioning very well in
practice, and no better substitute has been found.
SAMUEL BROOKS MENDENHALL
TORTS - Independent Contractor - Liability after
Completion of the Work and Acceptance by the Contractee.
- Plaintiff brought a wrongful death action against two de-
fendants who allegedly had created an attractive nuisance
resulting in the death of the plaintiff's eight year old son.
One of the defendants, an independent construction contrac-
tor, had moved a large display counter, placing it upon an
incline in such a way as to be unstable and thereby constitute
an attractive nuisance upon the premises of the other de-
fendant, a business establishment. Thirteen days after com-
pletion of the work and three days before a formal accept-
ance, plaintiff's intestate was found crushed to death under
the display counter. There were no witnesses to the accident.
At the time of the accident the premises were in the sole
possession of the owner-defendant, but the contractor had
remained on the premises for a period of eight days after the
creation of the attractive nuisance before the practical ac-
ceptance of the work took place. At the trial the jury awarded
actual damages against both defendants to be apportioned
between them equally. Only the defendant contractor ap-
[Vol. 12
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pealed, contending, inter alia, that its liability was termi-
nated upon the completion and acceptance of the work by the
other defendant. HELD: Reversed. A contractor's liability
to third persons receiving injury as a result of the contrac-
tor's negligent conduct is discharged by a practical accept-
ance of the completed work by the contractee. Clyde v. Sum-
erel, 233. C. 228, 104 S. E. 2d 392 (1958).
Under the general rule, an independent contractor is not
liable to third persons for damages or injuries resulting from
the condition of the work after the work has been turned over
to the contractee or owner of the land. Ford v. Sturgis, 14 F.
2d 253, 52 A. L. R. 619 (D. C. Cir. 1926), expressly overruled
by Hanna v. Fletcher, 231 F. 2d 469, 58 A. L. R. 2d 847 (D. C.
Cir. 1956), cert. denied, Gichner Iron Works, Inc. v. Hanna,
351 U. S. 989 (1956); 2 HARPER AND JAMES, TORTS § 18.5
(1956). A formal acceptance of the work is not necessary,
and the liability of the contractor will cease upon the contrac-
tee's practical acceptance of the work. Wilson v. North Cen-
tral Gas Co., 163 Neb. 664, 80 N. W. 2d 685 (1957) ; Nichols
v. Craven, 224 S. C. 244, 78 S. E. 2d 376 (1953). The excep-
tions to the general rule are almost as numerous as the fac-
tual situationsto which it is applied. Slavin V. McCann Plumb-
ing Co., 73 So. 2d 902 (Fla. 1954) ; Annotation, 58 A. L. R.
870 (1958). Thus, the contractor remains liable after the work
has been turned over to the contractee where the work is so
negligently done as to be imminently dangerous to third per-
sons, provided the contractor knows or should know of the
dangerous situation created by him and the owner does not
know of the dangerous condition and would not discover it
by a reasonable inspection. Kuhr Bros., Inc. v. Spahos, 89 Ga.
App. 885, 81 S. E. 2d 491 (1954); Price v. Johnson Cotton
Co., 226 N. C. 758, 40 S. E. 2d 344 (1946) ; Rouse v. John-
son, 136 W. Va. 607, 80 S. E. 2d 857 (1954). However, in some
cases the exception to the general rule of non-liability does
not include imminence of danger as a requisite, the require-
ment is that the thing be reasonably certain to place life and
limb in peril when negligently made. Freeman v. Mazzera,
150 Cal. App. 61, 309 P. 2d 510 (1957) ; Hale v. Depaoli, 33
Cal. 2d 228, 201 P. 2d 1 (1948). But the owner's maintenance
of the work after acceptance of it in a dangerous condition
which is obvious to him, constitutes negligence and oper-
ates as the intervention of an independent cause which will,
under certain circumstances, destroy the casual connection
1960]
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of the contractor's original negligence. Greenwood v. Lyles
and Buekner, Inc., 329 P. 2d 1063 (Okla. 1958) ; Hale v. De-
paoli, supra. By taking possession the owner is presumed to
have made a reasonable inspection and to know of the defects
and he accepts the defects and the negligence that caused
them as his own, unless the dangerous condition is one which
is not discoverable by a reasonable inspection. Slavin v. Kay,
108 So. 2d 462 (Fla. 1959); First Presby. Congregation v.
Smith, 163 Pa. St. 561, 30 Atl. 279 (1894). However, if the
contractor could have reasonably anticipated that the con-
tractee would not correct the defect, the chain of causation
is not broken by the new and efficient negligence of the con-
tractee. Greenwood v. Lyles and Buckner, supra. The passage
of time and intervening occupancy may limit application of
the exception to the general rule of non-liability after accept-
ance by the owner, but such incidents present questions of
fact and not of law. Greenwood v. Lyles and Buckner, supra;
Hale v. Depaoli, supra. According to the modern trend, build-
ing contractors are placed on the same footing as sellers of
goods and are held to the same general standard of reason-
able care for the protection of anyone who may foreseeably
be endangered by the negligence, even after acceptance of
the work. Hanna v. Fletcher, supra; Hale v. Depaoli, supra.
The contractee's failure to inspect will make him liable, but
will not relieve the contractor whose negligence created the
dangerous situation in the first place. Foley v. Pittsburgh-
Des Moines Steel Co., 363 Pa. 1, 68 A. 2d 517 (1949); RE-
STATEMENT, TORTS § 396 (1934). The rule that a general con-
tractor is not liable for injuries to third persons resulting
from his negligence in construction of the work after the work
is completed and accepted by the contractee, because of lack
of privity of contract, has been held to be no longer the law.
Dow v. Holly Mfg. Co., 49 Cal. 2d 720, 321 P. 2d 736 (1958).
The attractive nuisance doctrine can be invoked not only
against the possessor of land for constructing or maintain-
ing conditions dangerous to children, but also against a con-
tractor. Woods v. City and County of San Francisco, 148 Cal.
App. 956, 307 P. 2d 698 (1957) ; Carter v. Livesay Window
Co., Inc., 73 So. 2d 411 (Fla. 1954). Although there is a prem-
ise that buildings in process of construction are attractive to
children, it must be shown further that the contractor created
an instrumentality inherently dangerous to children because it
is in the nature of a trap. Miller v. Guernsey Const. Co., 112
[Vol. 12
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So. 2d 55 (Fla. 1959) ; Carter v. Livesay Window Co., Inc.,
supra. Inherently dangerous means unusually hazardous or
that in the end there is danger. Vale v. Bonnett, 191 F. 2d
334 (D. C. Cir. 1951) ; Miller v. Struck Const. Co., 251 S. W.
2d 457 (Ky. 1952). Each case must be judged on its particu-
lar facts according to the requirements that have to be met
for the attractive nuisance to apply. Woods v. City and
County of San Francisco, supra; Carter v. Livesay Window
Co., Inc., supra. According to the weight of authority in this
country, a building under construction is not per se an attrac-
tive nuisance. Miller v. Guernsey Const. Co., supra; Annota-
tion, 44 A. L. R. 2d 1253 (1955). The modern trend is to hold
building contractors to the same general standard of reason-
able care for the protection of anyone who may foreseeably
be endangered by his negligence, even after acceptance of the
work. Tomchic v. Julian, 340 P. 2d 72 (Cal. 1959) ; Hanna v.
Fletcher, supra; 27 Am. JuR. Independent Contractors § 55
(Supp. 1959).
Under the modern view, the rule of the nonliability of a
contractor to third persons for injuries suffered after prac-
tical acceptance of the work by the contractee or owner has
undergone a complete change in recent years. According to
the reasoning in many of these later cases, the MacPherson
doctrine has been applied in the area of structures, recogniz-
ing the fact that there is no sufficient differentiation be-
tween the liability of a manufacturer of chattels and a build-
ing contractor. This is not to say that the contractor is abso-
lutely liable for any defects in his work, or that he will
become an insurer for any injuries to third persons resulting
from conditions that he has created. On the contrary, the
discarding of the general rule will only result in the elimi-
nation of an anachronistic legal principle which has created
a pocket of immunity for the contractor to bide his negligence
in, and will substitute ordinary negligence principles as a
foundation for liability. The holding in the present case seems
contrary to the modern trend in this country in view of the
numerous exceptions which have rendered sterile the general
rule of nonliability of contractors after practical acceptance
of the work by the contractee. There has been only one other
case in South Carolina on this point, Nichols v. Craven, 224
S. C. 244, 78 S. E. 2d 376 (1953). Because of the distinguish-
ing feature of affirmative conduct on the part of the contrac-
tee, that case seems to have been correctly decided on the
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facts, in line with the modern authority. It would seem de-
sirable in the future to hold the contractor liable for his
negligence if it were the proximate cause of the injury to a
third person, despite acceptance of the work by the con-
tractee.
HERBERT L. MOODY, JR.
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